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Turning Worms: Some Thoughts on Liabilities for
Spreading Computer Infections
Richard C. Owens†

A Time of Plague

(what does it really mean when we assess liability on the
basis of a ‘‘trespass’’ in cyberspace?) sometimes obscures
analysis.
This article, then, is a brief speculation on liabilities
in Canada for the spread of viruses and worms. 6

T

he Internet teems with malevolent computer code
created with malice, from boredom or callous
greed. Often classed with other invasive software as
‘‘malware’’, it comprises viruses, worms, Trojan horses,
spyware, and the like. 1 It is a rare computer that has not
suffered in one of the many recent epidemics — Win32,
the sobig virus, the Slammer worm, beagle, and so on. 2
An infection gives rise, potentially, to many symptoms.
One’s computer and address book may be used as a junk
electronic mail relay, 3 or as a spam generator in a denial
of service attack. 4 Perhaps computer operations will stop
so a message will appear on the screen; perhaps all the
data and programmes in the computer hard drives will
be deleted. Serious damages often ensue. Faced perhaps
with the remains of a trashed hard drive, a user might,
then, overlook the fact that he or she has also been an
unwitting agent of the spread of a worm, which has
hijacked his or her computer and address book to fulfil
its vermian destiny, visiting havoc on his or her fellows.
In such circumstances, it would be cruel indeed not
only to find a hard drive trashed, but to be sued for
damages arising from an unknowing role in the spread
of a worm, to boot. Could it happen? The extent of
liability for an inadvertent role in turning a worm is
difficult to gauge. But the consequences of infections are
so serious and so widespread that it is only a matter of
time before this, and a plethora of other legal questions
arising from the proliferation of worms and viruses,
come before the courts. 5
Two aspects of the virus/worm liability problem are
of particular note. The first is how tightly the Internet
binds together many possible defendants; those who
build and run it, those who populate it with increasingly
complex electronic commerce Web sites, those who provide terminal software, those who send electronic mails,
those who design its security algorithms, those who
insure it, and those who hack it, amongst others.
The second aspect is how speculative such a review
is. Little case law pertains. Even the language of the law

A Steady Diet of Worms

A

s we are reminded in Shakespeare’s Hamlet, ‘‘your
worm is your only emperor for diet’’, 7 meaning that
the worm feasts equally on the low and the mighty. As
we look at the mounting financial carnage from computer worms, their omnivorousness is apparent.
Damages arising from viruses and worms are universally estimated to be enormous. The SQL Slammer
worm is said to have caused over US$1 billion in
damage worldwide in 2002. 8 In 2001, the costs of the
Code Red worm and Code Red II virus were estimated
at more than US$2 billion. A recent study suggests that
damage from worms and viruses in the United States in
2003 exceeded US$55 billion. In 2001, a PriceWaterhouseCoopers study estimated the annual global
costs of malicious computer use at US$1.6 trillion. 9 Such
figures are inherently unreliable, but certainly indicative
of the order of magnitude of such harm. Recently, the
Symantec Internet Security Threat report stated:
In August 2003, the Win32.Blaster blended threat rapidly
spread worldwide, and several other highly severe worms
followed. In only eight days the pace and frequency of these
threats created havoc for systems administrators as well as
for PC home users, with an estimated cost of damages running up to $2 billion . . . some corporations were prepared
and not affected by these threats while others were unprepared. 10

The scope of the problem, and in particular, the
scale of damages in notable cases, can be hard to calculate; worm attacks often go unreported because many
corporate victims do not want the existence of security
weaknesses known. 11 According to one U.K. security
researcher, viruses and worms targeting Microsoft systems cost users $64.5 billion in productivity loss, hard-
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34
ware and software upgrades and data recovery in the
third quarter of 2003 alone. 12
Far more such damage will certainly arise. It once
was difficult to create a virus or a worm, and it once
required a significant effort to spread it to other computers. Today, software applications that any user can use
to create worms can be readily downloaded from the
Internet. These applications are easy to find and to use,
and since a worm is self-propagating, the resulting creations are easily spread. In fact, in 2001, worms became
the most widespread computer infections, surpassing
macro and boot viruses. 13
Even the FBI has, apparently, risked incurring liability for spreading viruses. In its magic lantern scheme,
the FBI itself planned to distribute a virus-like computer
programme. This programme would have installed itself
on the computers of certain Internet subscribers targeted
for surveillance. It would have recorded, and reported to
the FBI, the click streams 14 of the computer users, circumventing privacy enhancing technologies on the computer. (These might include, for instance, encryption of
electronic mail.) Since the complete click stream could
be caught, it would have also provided access to a great
deal of other data entered into the computer. To distribute this programme required the co-operation of
Internet Service Providers (‘‘ISP’’) and anti-virus software
makers, which in both cases was generally withheld,
apparently because of their concern for ill effects on the
computer systems of their customers, and the attendant
liabilities of those effects. The reputational effects of
being party to such an invasion of privacy could not have
eluded them either.

Taxonomy of Pests
Viruses and worms are computer programmes
designed to propagate and to perform certain behaviours
that are damaging to, and out of the control of the
owner/operator of the computer that animates them. A
virus spreads itself by infecting — travelling on the back
of — a certain computer file or files, often a .exe file. A
standard virus only spreads when an infected file is transferred from one computer to another, and opened. A
worm, on the other hand, does not infect a specific file,
and it sends itself from one computer to another without
needing to ride in a particular file. 15 The biological metaphors ‘‘virus’’ and ‘‘worm’’ are apposite; given in particular a true virus’s ambiguous status as an independent
life form, it is unable to propagate without a cellular
host. Worms are clearly parasitic, but autonomous.
Computer worms fall broadly into two categories,
differing in the way that they spread from one computer
to another. A co-dependent (or mass-mailer) worm
enters a computer by hiding in an e-mail attachment.
Once the user opens the infected e-mail attachment, the
worm infects the computer, and then e-mails itself to
everyone in the computer’s e-mail address book. A network-aware (or loner) worm spreads itself from one com-
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puter to another by entering security holes. 16 This loner
worm bypasses the user and infects his or her computer.
From there, the worm scans the Internet for other computers that also have a security hole through which it can
enter, and then infects those computers. 17
An example of a loner worm is the SQL Slammer
worm. The Slammer worm took advantage of a flaw in
Microsoft’s SQL Server software and used it as a means
to enter computers, copy itself, and spread to other computers. 18 The SQL Slammer worm infected over 120,000
computers throughout the world in January 2003, 19
interfering with bank machines, ISP operations, telecommunications, and many corporate networks. 20 A patch
was issued by Microsoft six months prior to the spread of
the SQL Slammer worm to fix the security hole that the
worm used to spread itself, yet many companies did not
apply the patches to their IT networks. 21
In most respects, the rules for determining liability
relating to damage for a virus will be like those for a
worm. But viruses, and some worms, are activated when
an attachment to electronic mail is opened. This adds an
element of volition to their spread or, at least, a clear
chance to avoid harm, which could be significant for a
determination of liability. In virtually all cases of infection, a user could be alerted to the activity of the worm
or virus, regardless of whether he or she took a deliberate
step to bring it to life. Depending on the nature of the
infection and the configuration and use of the software,
signs of unusual activity in the user’s computer might be
evident. For instance, if a central processing unit capacity
monitor (an integral part of Microsoft Windows) were
open and running, unusual activity not accounted for by
the user’s behaviour would be indicated. Slow response
times could be another tip-off. Ignoring such signs might
be described as reckless of the risk one’s infected computer posed or, indeed, negligent.
The vigilance of network administrators and
software vendors means that various notices often
attend, or precede, the arrival of a worm or virus. By
creating an opportunity to avoid harm, they can be
expected to increase the risk of liability for those whose
failure to heed them results in damages. There are perhaps, broadly speaking, two sorts of such warnings, and
they are not always as clear or as prompt as they might
be. In the first, a software maker, alerted by normal
maintenance activity or by an alert user, detects a flaw in
the software’s security structure. A warning is provided
and a patch prepared. Such warnings might be sent by
electronic mail to systems administrators, and would in
any event be posted on a Web site. But such alerts are
issued frequently. Which ones merit quick action? How
often ought a responsible user visit the Web site to
search for such warnings? The second type of warning is
that a particular worm or virus is on the move. This
warning typically arrives in one’s mailbox sometime after
the worm itself, presumably attenuating the warning’s
legal effect.
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Even if a warning were received, however, there
might be reason not to heed it. For reasons discussed
below, a user might reasonably consider whether the risk
of installing the software patch proffered as a solution to
the identified security risk is itself a greater risk than the
uncertain threat of an infection.

Digital Hygiene
Patches

O

perating systems, browsers, and other software can
provide an unwitting welcome to a virus or worm.
Indeed, the intervals grow ever shorter between the distribution of a software version with such a weakness, and
its discovery and exploitation by worm breeders. 22 A
flaw might be a coding error that left a hole for an
infection. Alternately, it could arise from a deliberate
‘‘back door’’ left in a software release when it was distributed. This might have been done to permit maintenance
access, to permit use to be cut off in the event of failure
to pay licence fees (a tactic of dubious legality), or for
other, more sinister reasons. Presumably, leaving an
undisclosed back door that promotes an infection could
increase the chance of licensor liability — and could
undermine the efficacy of contractual exclusions from
liability.
A security flaw might not result from a true error. It
might simply reflect a small and temporary deficit in a
responsible programming team’s approach to the
unending ‘‘arm’s race’’ between software companies and
hackers. Again, the nature of the flaw can be expected to
influence a finding of negligence or breach of warranty.
Either negligent work or a deliberate back door justify
liability. Security weaknesses commensurate with
industry best practices (however deficient such practices
might seem, in hindsight) do not.
Flaws in software might or might not matter in
terms of security; many bugs have no such implication.
As security flaws (and other bugs) are discovered in
software with an installed base of customers, repair code
is developed and made available on the licensor’s Web
site. These individual repairs are called ‘‘patches’’. It is up
to the user to access and install the patches, or not. Some
software includes the ability to automatically access
updates and patches; in fact, this is increasingly the case.
For a user to avail himself or herself of this automatic
update facility, he or she must have registered with the
distributor of the software. Additionally, the user must
not interfere with the preferences settings that allow the
service to run or, if they are not on as a default when
installed, activate them. If a dialogue box requests confirmation to run the update routine and, afterward, to
restart the computer to allow the updates to take effect,
consent must be given.
Whether or not a duty of care existed to avoid
infection by the installation of a patch will depend upon
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proof that a particular patch was available, known, and
perhaps whether its installation could have been
expected to be reasonably convenient and non-disruptive in relation to the harm it might potentially avoid.
And, to make matters still more ambiguous, now some
worms themselves arrive disguised as patches.
With respect to complex platforms, especially enterprise networks, patches pose problems magnified by the
scale of the enterprise. Security patches might interfere
with the operation of complex systems that combine a
number of software packages, so administrators may reasonably decide not to install certain patches some of the
time. Furthermore, the patches themselves can be buggy.
Keeping up with the patch stream for one’s business
software is an increasing productivity drain. It means
taking down Web sites and other applications that
owners want operational all the time. It means redirecting scarce resources to unpredictable maintenance
requirements. In many enterprises, solving the problem
means the tedious work of installing the patch and rebooting not a few but thousands of individual servers
and personal computers, each with its own copies of
vulnerable systems. 23 Yet to maintain a computer network open to the Internet and not to patch promptly,
and thereby provide a weak node in which to breed
worms and provide the central processing unit (‘‘CPU’’)
cycles to propel them on their cyberspace journey, might
be regarded as unneighbourly, or even negligent.

Anti-Virus Software
Symantec Corporation (‘‘Symantec’’) and McAfee
(part of Network Associates, Inc.) are software manufacturers who are among the leading distributors of virus
protection software. Such software relies on filters that
scan network traffic and local memory and storage for
the presence of worms. The ability to recognise a worm
is dependent on whether the software is able to match
invading code to a reference point in an up-to-date
library of worms on the same computer; to have an upto-date library obliges the user to download updates
from the applicable Web site regularly. To fail to update
the library is to avoid an opportunity to prevent infection. Often, such updates occur automatically and regularly, giving rise to the question of when a ‘‘special’’
update is an obligation because of potential risk.
Whether not acquiring any such update is part of a given
standard of care will depend on the sophistication of the
user and the extent, nature, and duration of publicity
and warnings about the damaging bug.
Symantec’s Web site tells us just how intense the
war against computer bugs is. Describing its efforts,
Symantec reports:
With over 20,000 sensors monitoring network activity in
over 180 countries, Symantec has established one of the
most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the
world, giving Symantec’s analysts a superior source of attack
data from which to spot important trends. 24
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Tainted Meat
Spam, or junk e-mail, is an acknowledged public
policy problem. 25 As we will see later in this paper, it is a
growing source of the proliferation of worms. The
common occurrence of receiving e-mail from strangers
also helps worms to intrude. Thus, spam filters might
also prove a useful anti-worm weapon.

Unsafe Computing: of Quarantine
and Carriers
Potential Defendants

W

ho might be liable for worm infestations? Potential defendants would vary with the circumstances of the infection, 26 but they would certainly
include the worm’s author, and anyone who modified it
or used it to launch an attack. 27 Hardware manufacturers
would generally seem to be relatively remote from liability. Firewalls, which are generally software barriers to
intrusion, are sometimes hardware-based. Where such a
solution is implemented and proved faulty, liability
would seem more likely.
Vulnerabilities to worms are primarily a problem
for computer operating systems. Other software, such as
databases and e-mail systems, helps to spread viruses and
worms. The liability of hardware manufacturers, therefore, would seem most likely to arise from the software
they choose to bundle with their products. Such liability,
however, might be avoided because they succeeded in
making clear to the plaintiff at the time of purchase that
the software manufacturer, and not the hardware manufacturer, entered into the supply relationship with the
plaintiff.
Hardware supplier responsibility could also be
denied based on an issue of causation. If an operating
system chosen resulted in harm from a worm because of
vulnerabilities, how could a hardware manufacturer have
avoided that harm? Perhaps Microsoft Windows is
known to be a popular target for viruses, but how can
software manufacturers not bundle it? It is not as though,
after all, many alternative operating systems that would
be immune present themselves as practical alternatives,
and are acceptable to the consumer. Liability might be
less likely to arise, therefore, on the theory that a poor
product was chosen and supplied, than on a failure of a
duty to warn, which is discussed further, below.
Whether a customer realizes that a third party supplied bundled software is an issue that will test the techniques used to bring software licences, and their
attendant liability restrictions, to the customer’s attention when a computer is purchased. Perhaps such a test
will come up in the context of a class action suit by
purchasers who failed to notice the ribbon around their
keyboards, for instance. Amongst the numerous techniques to bring to the attention of computer purchasers
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the terms of the licences governing the installed software
has been that of a notice wrapped around and fastened
to the computer’s keyboard, preventing the computer’s
use without first seeing and removing it. Sometimes the
notice of a license is put on the shipping box. In any
event, the problem is the same — ensuring both that the
consumer is aware that he or she is entering into a
relationship with a different business in respect of the
software components of his or her purchase, and that his
or her use of those components is governed by its own
set of terms. These terms, in the normal course, would
provide for exclusions of certain types of liabilities; if the
drafter of them were sufficiently adept, it might include
losses owing to invasions of worms and attendant liabilities to third parties.
In addition to the foregoing, the list of potential
defendants for an action arising out of an infection is
long. They include:
●
anti-virus software manufacturers;
●
the proprietor of an electronic commerce Web
site, whose customer base becomes prey to a
worm, resulting in further spreading of the
worm and breaches of privacy;
●
a consultant, systems integrator, distributor,
retailer, or other vendor who recommended or
provided vulnerable technology, particularly in
the case of a holding out of a special capacity to
deal with security issues;
●
consultants hired to assess security or fix vulnerabilities;
●
security auditors;
●
a provider of managed security services;
●
an application service provider;
●
an outsourcing vendor with responsibility for an
electronic commerce Web site, applications
software, or computer desktop management;
and
●
an Internet service provider. 28

Contractual Defences
The liability of any party would vary with the
nature, and enforceability, of contractual terms. Particularly relevant provisions would include limitations of liability, limitations of damages, waivers of implied warranties, limitations of warranties, and the like. Such defences
will benefit the service provider and licensor. Needless to
say, infections (like human varieties) do not spread only
among relationships of contractual privity or other close
relationships. Their independent spread across a network
will result in damage arising from one network node in
another that is entirely unknown. Often there will be no
contractually based defences that would apply between
infecter and infectee. Infection by a stranger, however,
might implicate other contractual relationships. For
instance, a Web site that collected names and electronic
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mail addresses from clients might be able to argue that
the terms of its Web wrap or other form of agreement
with them would apply to limit damages arising from
the propagation of worms to the e-mail list.

Liability of Individuals
While many of those particular defendants encompassed by the list above will prove to be corporate entities, the potential for individual liability also arises. In
some cases, some of those described above will not have
been part of a corporation. Even if they were, individuals
will be directly responsible, at some level, for the causes
of the damage, even if they are doing so in the name of a
corporation. Given the trend to relax the requirements of
contractual privity to allow employees to shelter behind
contractual limitations of liability favouring their
employers, 29 individual coders or posters of patches, network administrators, or any number of other individuals
in the world of network and software services and maintenance will probably be safe from damages occasioned
by them in the course of their work (assuming that their
employers negotiated adequate and enforceable contractual limitations of liability in the first place). Needless to
say, while an individual would probably benefit from
contractual exclusions of liability, except in circumstances of fraud or undisclosed agency, he or she would
not be liable for performance of the contract. He or she
would not be subject to liabilities for covenants or warranties contractually imposed in the inter-corporate
transaction. This is not the case for his or her individual
liability in tort, however, where the foreseeability of
harm could result in personal liability.
Individual investors who have involved themselves
with a software firm through a partnership structure so
as to take direct advantage of tax losses could be in for
nasty surprises as direct owners, and therefore licensors,
of computer software. Again, they would benefit from
the terms of the licence (and, in any event, such structures have been out of vogue for some time, not least for
reasons of potential liability).
Needless to say, a corporate veil will not shield a
hacker from criminal liability.
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Steps to mitigate the effect of worms are being
taken by ISPs. They are beginning to actively seek out
customers whose computers have been turned into
‘‘zombies’’ — that is, spam relayers — where the volumes
of messages spike. Customers are contacted or cut off. It
should be noted, though, that false results can arise from
mail system responses to hacker probes. Also, working
groups of ISPs have been organized to share information
on spam and worm attacks. 31 To engage in such proactive oversight could enhance the risk of liability, as it has
with respect to liability for libellous content on their
servers. 32
Radin has argued 33 that liability will converge on
ISPs as technology to detect and quarantine virus-laden
traffic becomes available, making them the least cost
avoider of harm. However, it is far from clear that adding
and maintaining such a layer of costly security, with its
potential for disruptions, mistakenly seized e-mails, and
the like, would truly be ‘‘least cost’’. Even if it were
installed, it is unlikely to be perfect. The remaining
potential for failure would result in high levels of redundancy, as users would rationally continue to install their
own anti-virus protection. This might defeat societal cost
savings. There could also be the risk of a false detection
resulting in intercepted, uninfected mail, or delayed
deliveries. Failure to update the software firewall could
create a basis for a negligence claim. It has also been
suggested that ISPs might have a duty to warn of the
risks of contamination attendant on the use of their
services, particularly high bandwidth. 34 Finally, it is a
difficult context in which to try to pin down who the
least cost avoider is, for such a determination will always,
at least, be contingent on the selection of particular technologies available at any given time. We must be careful
not to constrain the inventiveness that will produce that
selection by limiting incentives with premature choices
of liability rules.
In the case of copyright infringement, ISPs, as telecommunications services providers, are held harmless for
merely providing facilities over which infringing content
is communicated. Perhaps a case exists for similar protection to be extended to operating general application
worm protection facilities.

Liability of ISPs
By virtue of their position, ISPs are in a position to
become aware of the risks of a worm, and the increased
traffic and effects on Internet operation, earlier than end
users. In the right situation, perhaps they could prevent
damage by shutting down their servers, or by filtering
out messages that appear wormy or virus-bearing. Yet,
the principle of the Internet is end-to-end neutrality. The
Internet community does not expect its messages to be
legitimately intercepted or snooped; indeed, absent a
grant of permission under the customer agreement, section 342.1 of the Criminal Code (Canada) 30 would presumably apply.

Theories of Liability
Criminal Liability

T

he Criminal Code (Canada) 35 does not specifically
address the propagation of worms and viruses.
Criminal liability pertaining to certain abuses of computers is dealt with in sections 342.1 and 342.2, and
subsections 430(1.1) and (5.1). Depending on the precise
circumstances of the attack and its consequences, one of
these provisions could apply.

38
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Section 342.1 deals with the offence of ‘‘Unauthorized use of Computer’’. Subsection 342.1(1) states that:
(1) Every one who, fraudulently and without colour of right,
(a) obtains, directly or indirectly, any computer service,
(b) by means of an electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device, intercepts or causes to be intercepted, directly or indirectly, any function of a computer system,
(c) uses or causes to be used, directly or indirectly, a
computer system with intent to commit an offence
under paragraph (a) or (b) or an offence under section 430 in relation to data or a computer system,
or
(d) uses, possesses, traffics in or permits another person
to have access to a computer password that would
enable a person to commit an offence under paragraph (a), (b) or (c)
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding ten years, or is guilty of an offence
punishable on summary conviction.

This section is directed at hacking into computer
systems without authorization or payment, but its
expansive language could apply to the author of a virus
or worm attack.
Paragraph 342.1(1)(a) would almost always apply to
an infection by a worm. The worm diverts the operation
of the computer to the purposes of the worm and its
author. In some cases, the result might not be very constructive, even from the author’s perspective, leading one
to quibble whether the worm-triggered computer
response was, indeed, a ‘‘service’’. But since that response
is intended by the author, it would hardly lie in his or
her mouth to disclaim that he or she valued it to any
extent as a service. It would obviously apply, in particular, to the use of a Trojan horse borne by a worm to
commandeer CPU cycles. Or, consider the Code Red
virus, which gave the attacker ‘‘complete administrator
access to systems, which means it had the potential to
plunder data, delete files and destroy systems’’. 36 Viruses
used to take over a computer to propagate spam would
appear to fall clearly within the intent of the section.
Since paragraph 342.1(1)(a) so clearly applies, it is
not troubling that paragraph (b) is slightly more problematical. While a worm is almost certainly a device (or,
if not, the combination of the worm and the computer
that launched it would be), it is less clear that a virus in
many circumstances can be said to ‘‘intercept’’ a function. Paragraph (c) would apply, since the author’s computer system would have been used at least with the
intent of committing an offence under paragraph (a).
Under section 342.2, ‘‘Possession of Device to
Obtain Computer Service’’, the manufacture, possession,
sale, or offer to sell any instrument, device or component
under circumstances that could create a reasonable inference that it was intended to be used to commit an
offence under section 342.1 is illegal, and could result in
two years’ imprisonment, or a finding of guilty of a summary conviction offence. 37 Again, the section is directed
at devices, like the famous Captain Crunch whistle 38 or

other, more sophisticated electrical acoustic devices
(‘‘blue boxes’’), which circumvent security systems to provide access to systems without permission. But it is no
stretch to extend the section to apply to the author of a
worm, to an individual in possession of the worm, or at
least to the worm and a computer capable of launching
it.
Subsection 430(1.1) of the Criminal Code deals
with mischief to data:
430(1.1) Every one commits mischief who willfully
(a) destroys or alters data;
(b) renders data meaningless, useless or ineffective;
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful
use of data; or
(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person
in the lawful use of data or denies access to data to
any person who is entitled to access thereto.
A person convicted of this offence could be sentenced for up
to five years in prison, or found guilty upon summary conviction and subjected to a lesser sentence. 39

Again, this section was not intended to deal with
worms and viruses, but to set loose a worm or virus
could often result in liability under it. If the worm did
not actually destroy or alter data, however, paragraph 430(1.1)(a) would not apply (although the attempt
provisions of the Criminal Code would, depending on
design of the virus). But the slowing of computer operation, or its unresponsiveness, frequent results of worms,
could be obstructions or interruptions in the lawful use
of data described in paragraphs (c) and (d).
Based on the foregoing, then, it is likely that the
actus reus of an offence could be made out in the case of
a worm attack. Criminal liability depends also on proof
of intent. While it would apply to the hacker creator of
malicious code, it would not to the unwitting provider of
the equipment, networks, or computing power used to
disseminate worms. 40
Other criminal liability might attach, depending on
the means of worm delivery. Examples such as the recent
virus purporting itself to be a patch from Microsoft
might qualify as a forgery under section 366 of the Criminal Code. So, too, might the offence of fraud, under
section 380, be made out.
The difficulty of tracing the origin of worms, and
the great cost of doing so, bring into question the efficacy
of criminal deterrence as a solution to the worm
problem. As one commentator put it
Although nearly 63,000 viruses have rolled through the
Internet, causing an estimated $65 billion (U.S.) in damage,
criminal prosecutions have been few, penalties light and just
a handful of people have gone to prison . . . One person has
been sent to prison in the United States and just two in
Britain . . . 41

The absence of credible criminal enforcement is
obviously a problem. To remedy this, Microsoft recently
set aside US$5 million to fund rewards for worm
authors. 42
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Contractual and Quasi-Contractual
Liability
Various warranties, covenants, or representations —
by software licensor to licensee, outsourcer to client, ISP
to client, etc. — could be breached by a worm attack, or
by attendant service or system failures. Such terms would
usually be found in a written (or electronic) contract, but
might also be collateral. 43
Common contractual terms that could be breached
include:
●

warranties relating to the performance of
software designed to enhance system security, or
to the expertise of those providing securityrelated services;

●

covenants in an outsourcing contract to maintain the currency of software versions, or of hardware and software in use, where a prompt
change would have corrected a vulnerability; 44

●

covenants in an outsourcing contract directed
more generally to ensuring continual adoption
of best available technologies; 45

●

covenants to maintain online disaster recovery
servers, where such servers themselves fell prey
to the infection and so become unavailable;

●

up time covenants by Web hosts or outsourcing
service providers;

●

overarching standard of performance covenants
(i.e., ‘‘outsourcer will in all circumstances perform in accordance with the highest industry
standards . . .’’);

●

security standards specified by or to system integrators; and

●

privacy policies of Web sites (a form of Web
wrap, to the extent that reliance can be said to
have been induced). 46

There will certainly be others. Rest assured that
imaginative counsel will visit afresh outstanding information technology and Internet contracts with the same
eye to vulnerability that the hacker displayed in
attacking the computer system. Both law and code, after
all, are systems of risk management, and all systems are
vulnerable to some degree. In this context, the clever
litigator is not unlike the clever hacker. And the solicitor
who designs protection for his or her clients is at the
peril of an unknowable future.
Any claims that the manufacturer or developer
made about the resistance of its hardware or software to
infection that were found to be incorrect could be considered negligent misrepresentations that could make
the manufacturer or developer liable to the licensee of
the software, whether or not such representations
formed a part of the contractual terms relating to the
provision of the software. 47
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Virtually every ISP and software licensor will have
contractual exclusions of liability in place that, presumably, will apply to worm and virus damage. It is, however,
worth noting that such contractual terms are strictly construed, which could limit their application if it is ambiguous in respect to the infection in question. Moreover,
generic — and non-negotiated — disclaimers may not
be legally enforceable in all jurisdictions. 48
Indeed, in theory, system users might not only be
unable themselves to collect from service or software
providers for the damages they have suffered because of
contractual exclusions, but standard terms could make
them liable to online services they infect. ANZ Bank’s
standard online banking terms got them in hot water
when it was noticed that they made customers contractually liable for passing on viruses. 49 Such terms are not
unusual. They are also, arguably, not advisable. No bank
is likely to sue a customer for failed operations (except
where such failure was the result of a deliberate act); why
provoke them with such a clause? The clause might
succeed on the principles of contract law. But if it did, it
would produce a situation that practically begged for
legislation to overrule it.
Unless effectively excluded by contract, provincial
sales of goods legislation could affect liability for
breaching warranties or conditions of sale, particularly
the warranty of fitness for the purpose intended by the
purchaser, or the condition of merchantability, for selling
products that contained latent defects. 50 Typically, however, any terms of sales of goods legislation that might
apply are excluded by the terms of the software licence.
In any event, sales of goods legislation may not apply to
software alone, since software is an intangible (although
packaged software is a ‘‘good’’ for Ontario Retail Sales
Tax purposes). Thus, a claim against a software vendor
based on sales and goods legislation may fail. On the
other hand, a claim against a hardware vendor, perhaps
relating to a bundle of hardware and software, might
succeed. Section 15 of the Ontario Sale of Goods Act
(‘‘SGA’’) 51 states that if the buyer has notified the seller of
the expressed or implied purpose for which he plans to
use the goods, there is an implied condition that the
goods sold by the seller are reasonably fit for that
expressed or implied purpose. 52
The implied conditions and warranties of the SGA
can be contracted out of through an express agreement
between the parties, 53 except in consumer sales. 54
It is an inherent characteristic of the spread of
worms that large groups of people are affected. The
Korean litigation (described in footnote 5) is a good
example of the large classes of potential defendants. A
gap in contractual protections, perhaps by the application of the SGA, could provide the foundation for a class
action.
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Tort
Intentional Torts
The FBI’s Magic lantern worm, mentioned above, is
a reminder that worms are spread for a variety of reasons: simple destruction, for political or ideological reasons, 55 for surveillance, or, in the case of the propagation
of spam, for commercial gain. 56 Recently, Trojans have
been installed in computers to enable access to online
bank accounts to facilitate unauthorized withdrawals. 57
While the existence of intent will be important to prove
certain offences and torts, the nature of the intent, in the
case of civil liability, should not be. If a computer crashes,
or data are destroyed, compensation for the loss should
not be diminished if the intention were to intrude with
fewer ill effects.
The challenging case for intention is one where the
authorship of the worm is not in doubt, but its escape is
proved to be accidental. Perhaps, then, liability would
flow from analogy to release of noxious substances.

Trespass
In Canada, no case has yet found liability for intentionally infecting a computer with a virus. It is undoubtedly an actionable wrong, but the exact nature of liability awaits elucidation. In the United States, the
doctrine of trespass to chattels has been used to find that
Web sites that experienced reduced bandwidth capacity
through receiving spam or being subjected to unwanted
data-gathering programs suffered property damage that
could be recoverable in tort, specifically the tort of trespass to chattels. 58 While the idea that causing a worm
infection is a form of trespass has the attraction of superficial analogy — it is, after all, to put someone else’s creation in a forbidden place — it is a novel interpretation of
the law. Opinions vary on whether a court could stretch
trespass doctrine in Canada to provide redress for worm
infections. Indeed, the trend of academic opinion in the
U.S. seems to resist this application of trespass law. 59 An
advantage of this legal theory, however, is that it helps
avoid the problem of pure economic loss, described
below.
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Nuisance
It is also possible that nuisance law could be
extended to provide a cause of action for the effects of
worms. If nuisance provides a remedy for annoying telephone calls, 60 why not for other nuisance communications?

Negligence
Any number of situations of vermian damage could
give rise to claims of negligence. To succeed, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant had a duty of care to the
plaintiff; that that duty was breached by failing to exercise the appropriate level of care, causing the injury complained of; and that the plaintiff suffered actual loss or
damage. 61

Duty of Care
A duty is owed to all those whom one ought reasonably to foresee would be affected by one’s actions. 62 The
Supreme Court of Canada has established a test for
determining if a duty of care existed between two parties
in private law. 63 The first stage of the two-stage test is
used to determine if the relationship between the parties
was sufficiently proximate that carelessness by one
would damage the other. If a proximate relationship
exists between them, the test permits the court to limit
or negate the scope of the duty, the class of persons to
whom it is owed, or the damages that arise from the
breach, 64 based upon policy considerations. 65 Thus, in
Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst and Young, 66 the
duty of an auditor was circumscribed, to avoid the risk of
indeterminate liability for a negligent statement in a
financial report that may have been put to use for purposes other than the original purpose for which it was
intended. 67

Misrepresentation

An auditor is a paradigmatic example of one who, if
negligent, could fall prey to an unpredictably and
unmanageably large number of lawsuits. This could
make the position of auditor untenable; hence, the need
to limit auditors’ exposure one way or another. Similar
considerations must limit liability for negligently
allowing the propagation of a virus or a worm over the
Internet, however the policy is expressed.

Another intentional tort that might come into play
for distribution of malicious code is misrepresentation.
To make a false representation that systems were secure
against intrusion could expose one to tort liability for
someone who relied on it, whether or not there was a
contract. The representation would have to be made to
the victim or reasonably foreseeably heard and acted on
by the victim. Similarly, since worms and viruses often
arise in electronic mails, which disguise their contents,
perhaps an action for fraudulent misrepresentation
would lie against the author.

The first stage of this test is difficult when dealing
with damage caused by network proximity, and it therefore compels careful consideration of the test. On the
Internet, everyone is your neighbour — millions and
millions of entities with separate title to terminal facilities, each of whom is a potential plaintiff (or defendant).
And, since the travel of worm packets is unpredictable,
someone in Chad or Mongolia is as proximate a neighbour as someone down the street. In the case of the
author of the damage, we are surely content to let him or
her find his or her legal peril, wherever his or her mis-

Turning Worms: Some Thoughts on Liabilities for Spreading Computer Infections

deed leads him or her. For an individual user, potentially
culpable only for negligence, if at all, such open-ended
liability is unjust. Assuming that it were possible to trace
the path of a particular infection to its immediate source,
a defendant would be exposed to a sort of lottery of
mischance. Can your unhygienic computer be shown to
have passed the problem only to the neighbour’s child’s
computer, or also to the U.S. and Russian governments?
Did it unwittingly pass on a bit of code that causes a
brief notice requesting a moment of silence on Remembrance Day to appear, or one that shuts down a national
economy? Faced with such a hazard, it is difficult to
describe the scope of a duty to other users. Thus,
whether for considerations of proximity or policy, we
would expect courts would rarely find a duty of care
where one is a careless node in the propagation of a
worm.
A similar policy calculation would hold for the
manufacturer or developer of vulnerable software provoking the creation of a particular worm, and helping it
to spread. That manufacturer would have a duty to the
parties whom it ought to reasonably foresee would be
affected by defects in its products. This would include
immediate clients, and those in contact with the clients.
The entire installed base could be affected (creating, presumably, a good basis for a class action). Third parties
who might have benefited had the software performed
to promise, but who had not themselves purchased the
software, are unlikely to be able to sustain a claim of
duty owed to them by the manufacturer. Indeed, were
they able to, they would almost certainly be in a better
position than the licensee, since rights would be limited
by the licence to which it had agreed.
Also, damages from worms would be principally
economic, recovery for which is limited under Canadian
law. 68 There are many reasons for this, including the
prevention of indeterminate liability, and the duplication of lawsuits that would be launched under contract
law. 69 However, Canadian National Railway v. Norsk
Pacific Steamship 70 has established that in Canadian law,
there can be recovery for economic loss if there is a
sufficient proximity between the negligent act and the
loss (along with the usual requirements of the presence
of a breach of duty and foreseeability of the loss). 71 The
test established in Cooper v. Hobart 72 is used to determine if a sufficiently proximate relationship exists
between the parties, and if any policy considerations
should limit or negate the scope of the duty or damages
awarded. Recovery for economic losses under tort law
can occur if the plaintiff can establish that his or her
losses arose from the defendant’s tortious act, were foreseeable, and sufficient proximity existed between the
parties.
Recovery of purely economic losses is confined to
limited categories of relationship. 73 While courts can be
expected to add to the existing categories in appropriate
cases, the prospect of huge and unforeseeable losses
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arising from the unknowable path of a worm is not a
likely case.
Enterprises could also be vicariously liable for the
actions of their employees, such as the deliberate forwarding of an infected joke, e-mail, or movie clip. Such
activity might or might not qualify. It would often
breach explicit employer guidelines, but it would be a
use of an employer system during business hours. The
negligent conduct of a systems administrator could
make his or her employer liable through vicarious liability. Employers are vicariously liable in two situations:
(1) for employee acts that are authorized by the employer, or
(2) unauthorized acts so connected with authorized acts that
they may be regarded as modes (albeit improper modes) of
doing an authorized act. 74

Standards of Care
At any given time, the actions required to meet a
standard of care for protection from spreading worms
will depend on the particular risks of the day and the
technologies available to meet them. The expected standard of care to avoid spreading a worm or virus will also
vary with the identity of the defendant. It will be higher
for a professional IT consultant than for a personal computer user, higher where legislation sets specific standards, such as where the requirements for security of
data in the Protection of Personal Information and Electronic Documents Act 75 apply, or where levels of IT
security and robustness are the subject of regulatory
oversight, as in the case of financial institutions. 76 Where
damage from a worm arose because of a breach of a
statutory standard of care, civil liability might be based
on the statutory breach.
There are several IT security organizations, such as
CERT 77 and SANS, 78 who have suggested measures that
IT professionals should take to better safeguard the
Internet. 79 The European Union is also setting up the
European Network and Information Security Agency,
expected to be operational early in 2004. 80 CERT also
has guidelines for the disclosure of known vulnerabilities. 81 Also significant is the International Organization
for Standardization standard ISO/IEC 1799:2000 Information technology — Code of practice for information
security management. 82 But there is no agreed standard,
nor any body governing the profession to set one. The
publications of CERT or SANS or ISO will have some
persuasive power, but no more, unless the defendant has
made an explicit commitment to a particular standard.
Such a commitment can be useful for marketing purposes (such as boasting of ISO 9001 quality control certification), and is often made. Another body with a mandate including protection of computer infrastructure is
the Office for Critical Infrastructure Preparedness
(‘‘OCIPEP’’), which has a programme of evaluating and
providing warnings about information technology
security failings. OCIPEP also helps to certify security
worthiness of technologies. 83 OCIPEP’s mandate, how-
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ever, is far broader than information technology (its Web
site, for instance, contains a grimly fascinating database
of Canadian natural disasters).
In computer services outsourcing contracts and
other services contracts, service providers will sometimes
agree to overall standard of service covenants. Such a
covenant might, for instance, promise standards of service in accordance with the best professional standards
of the industry. Such a covenant would help to resolve
any ambiguity in determining appropriate behaviours.
The standard of care for the maker of anti-virus
software is complex. There is no guarantee that effective
anti-virus software is always possible — that the coding
power of the good guys is always stronger than that of
the bad guys. Even when a solution is possible, the timeliness of its delivery must be subject to reasonable limits.
Discussion in security circles is full of talk of liability
for spreading viruses. Such discussion began when diskettes were used, long before it was assumed such viruses
would travel over the Internet. This is bound to be useful
to a plaintiff’s counsel proving standard of care. Thanks
to the Internet, such discussion is now well documented
and easily accessible. In any event, given the scale of the
problem and its topicality, it would be a rare case indeed
in which ignorance could be successfully argued.

Causation
Worms fast become ubiquitous on the Internet. For
every attack, one might receive several copies of an infection. At the height of the transmission of an infection by
electronic mail, it has been estimated that a significant
portion of all e-mail, exceeding 10%, is infected. Even if
there were a duty in a particular case, such as a duty to
warn, it is not clear that a particular infection is the result
of its breach. Any solution — a warning, a patch, the
addition to the database of anti-virus software, might not
be timely, or might not be effective. It has, in fact, been
argued that due to delays in installing patches,
announcing a security failing might be of greater service
to those who would exploit it than to those who should
fill the breach.
The determination of causation is also frustrated by
the difficulty of tracing the origin of a virus. Many viruses
are polymorphic, which means that they contain mutation engines that change their encryption routines each
time they are passed on to a new computer. 84 Therefore,
the virus that infected the upstream computer may have
been in a form that was not recognizable by its anti-viral
protection measures. Thus, even if reasonable measures
were taken, it could have mutated into a different form
that was recognizable by standard anti-viral precautions
by the time it moved downstream. This would create
significant evidentiary problems in a negligence lawsuit.
The virus would have been detectable at the downstream computer but not at the upstream one — making
it hard to impose liability on the upstream computer, or
to gauge what standard of care should have applied. 85
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Contributory Negligence
Contributory negligence may result in the apportionment of liability amongst several of the potential
defendants listed above. Foreseeability of harm to oneself
through one’s actions is the key component for contributory negligence. 86 If the downstream party did not take
reasonable measures to prevent viral infections, then it
may be at least partly liable under contributory negligence for the damages that it incurred.

Other Statutory Liabilities in Tort
Viruses and worm infections could lead to breaches
of statutory duties.
With enough warning of a security risk, a software
manufacturer might be in the possession of a material
fact as defined under applicable securities legislation,
requiring timely disclosure to the regulators and the
markets. Failure to do so might result in expensive shareholder litigation. But whether or not it is a material fact
depends to an extent on one’s assumptions about potential liability. It can also depend on one’s business; a bug
can be good for business, too, if your business is repair
and data recovery.
Canada’s federal privacy law, like its financial services legislation, contains obligations of data security, and
obligations of confidentiality. 87 However, the legislation
contains its own remedial mechanisms. Whether the
Act’s rules give private parties any rights to bring their
own action has not yet been determined, although in the
case of Englander v. Telus, 88 an application was heard to
grant relief following the Privacy Commissioner’s failure
to do so (the application was rejected). Other duties,
regulatory, statutory, or at common law, can also apply to
certain types of information, such as financial and healthcare-related data. The Bank Act (Canada) also contains
certain data security and IT operation requirements; in
some cases, it imposes the obligation directly on the
bank’s board of directors. 89 In an instance in which
directors approved confidentiality guidelines inadequate
for their purpose, perhaps an action against them could
result. It would appear to be difficult for a director to
argue that viruses and worms ought not to be contemplated as risks to confidentiality of data. Again, such
potential liability would only be invoked in a limited
subset of hacker attack, one in which confidential data
were disclosed.

Product Liability
Liability for failure to warn has been imposed on
manufacturers and suppliers of dangerous products.
They are required to warn all those who may reasonably
be affected by potentially dangerous products 90
(including parties who are not party to the contract of
sale). 91 It is unlikely, however, that this obligation could
extend to products causing risks of service disruption or
risks to data, since that is not truly ‘‘dangerous’’ as con-
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templated by that duty. This would not be the case,
however, if the machine at risk had a life-saving function,
like a radiation therapy device or an ambulance dispatch
service, or controlled a dangerous process such as in a
nuclear reactor or chemical plant. However, one would
hope that such devices would be thoroughly isolated
from contact with the Internet and any other foreseeable
sources of worms.
For the duty to warn to apply, the potential user
must be reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer or
supplier; ‘‘[however,] manufacturers and suppliers do not
have the duty to warn the entire world about every
danger that can result from improper use of their
product.’’ 92 Networked computer products would not
become ‘‘defective’’ — that is to say, use-impaired by
reason of infection — without the intervention of the
worm. Indeed, in some sense, the device ceases to be the
manufacturer’s ‘‘product’’, since the sole characteristic
making it dangerous is created by a third party. But this
might not prove to be an impermeable defence. A computer infection is not like a rider-mower souped up for
racing. In the mower case, the owner of an isolated
product has used it as the basis for a different, more
dangerous thing; it is his or her responsibility and initiative. Viruses and worms, however, mirror their product,
and their make up is determined by the deficiencies in
the product’s security — security intended to provide
precisely against the avoided harm. Moreover, those deficiencies present a risk of extraordinarily widespread
harm. In many cases, the manufacturer has the ability to
easily contact the software users by mailing to a database
of electronic mail addresses. The manufacturer is in the
business of monitoring the weaknesses of the product,
providing patches and new versions. Clearly, the risk of
physical harm is such that it is unlikely product liability
law should apply, but who can say that liability for negligence might not follow? Or that, in this new age, courts
will not find reasons to expand the reach of product
liability law into the ethereal, but altogether costly, realm
of cyberspace?

come to determine the structure of the code as well, the
author’s rights to prevent copying would be expected to
be limited.
Ironically, since viruses are often written for noncommercial reasons, they might have a better claim than
the average software for moral rights. Worms are usually
designed to convey political messages of one kind or
another, and shutting down the SCO or Microsoft Web
sites, while unquestionably criminal, might be just such
an instance that merits moral rights protection, in theory.
It is, however, unlikely to expect much judicial deference
to such rights.

Intellectual Property

Next Steps

It would be interesting to be able to invoke intellectual property laws against worm authors. Admittedly,
given the plethora of other remedies to which they could
be made subject, this aspect of the rights of the injured
might be of only academic interest, but it is an intriguing
question for the legal scholar. It would appear, on balance, that if a worm were sufficiently original, there
would be no reason in principle why it could not avail
itself of the limited protection of copyright laws afforded
to computer software. Such protection, however, is curtailed where software is expressed in its particular form
as it is, because of certain types of interface requirements
it must meet. 93 Since a worm is designed to exploit a
particular security flaw, this rule of copyright law would
significantly limit the scope of permitted protection for
the resulting code. To the extent that authoring tools

Insurance
Insurance companies play a role in establishing standards of care, since the ability to get insurance for infections is conditional on having adequate anti-viral measures in place. 94 A limited number of insurers offer
coverage for e-business and its attendant liabilities,
although such coverage appears currently to be limited
and expensive. 95 Insurers, including AIG 96 and Zurich 97
offer coverage for a wide range of electronic businessrelated interruptions, including liabilities relating to forwarding a virus or worm. Presumably, risk managers will
ensure that processes to maintain anti-virus protections
and to patch regularly will be in place, so as not to void
coverage. As coverage becomes more common in the
market, therefore, standards of practice are likely to be
clarified, and to become more exacting.
Currently, according to one source, only 11% of
‘‘organizations’’ have insurance against cybercrime,
which might include virus infestations. 98 The potential
scope of damage for computer failures and hacking is
great enough that such insurance is typically not cost
effective — its high price reflects the difficulty of quantifying the risk. Increases in security and clarifications of
liability risks will permit it to be priced more accurately,
and potentially increase its uptake.

T

he costs of computer infections, the number and
size of potential defendants, the industry’s unorthodox approach to contracting, the increasing role of
insurance — all these increase the probability that computer infections will provoke increasing litigation. Criminal prosecution is straightforward; legislation is in place
to penalize worm authors, and it is entirely appropriate
to do so. 99 But questions of civil liability, and the bases
for them, are more amorphous.
A cautious approach to sorting out civil obligations
is needed. We cannot wish perfect technology into
being; patience must attend the diligent efforts even of a
technologically adept behemoth like Microsoft. Liability
for failures of widely installed systems may well discourage innovators to participate in the market. Con-
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versely, of course, inadequate risk of liability might not
encourage sufficient diligence. The societal gains of
widespread computer access and use emerge in part
from affordability, which, in part, arises from the ability
of sellers of computer equipment and services to control
and understand their liability risks. It might be the case
that a clearer liability regime would cause resources to be
redirected to installing or creating new security measures, assuming better measures could be made available.
The net effect of those security measures — their cost
less avoided harm — might or might not be economically efficient. One thing is sure: perfect security will
always be technologically infeasible. Duty must be built
on a basis of reasonable efforts.
It is not easy now to identify least cost avoiders of
the harm of worms. If it is ISPs, then legislation
extending some protection to them in the course of
taking reasonable anti-virus measures would probably be
needed.
Moreover, it is up to each individual and business to
weigh the risks and rewards of the Internet, and bear
some of those risks, paying for what best seems to them
an appropriate level of security. It has been suggested
that to expose a business to the Internet might itself be
negligent:
‘‘Right now, you have an infrastructure that allows anyone
to connect without standards,’’ he said. ‘‘That creates a
major threat. [Businesses] are exposing services on the
Internet that have no business being exposed.’’ 100

The scale of the installed base of Windows (and,
perhaps, increasingly of Unix) and its related e-mail clients both enhances the opportunity for the spread of
worms and viruses, and greatly magnifies the potential
for harm. It has recently been suggested that the unavoidable risks borne by users of mass-market software
militate for an enhanced and clarified liability regime for
software distributors. 101 Indeed, Microsoft is being sued
on the basis that the ubiquity of its software presents a
global security risk. The suit is based on an identity theft
but cites also the Blaster worm. Counsel for the plaintiff
also suggests that Microsoft’s warnings about security
issues help hackers more than consumers, who are often
too slow to install patches — slower than the hackers
who attack their systems. The case is seeking class action
status. 102
Our dependence on networked computers is enormous, and growing. The regular increases in the power
of networked personal computers means that more and
more functions migrate to them. Thus, tasks once performed manually and discretely are automated, and, so,

sensitive to disruption; tasks once safe on a mid-size or
mainframe computer, secure in part because of its different operating system, also migrate to the desktop. This
means that vulnerable infrastructure — the infrastructure of corporations and governments and electronic
commerce — is no different than that in a hackers’ bedroom, greatly facilitating worm attacks.
To make matters worse, irresistible network effects
cause users to converge on the same systems, ensuring
that not just user groups but whole societies are susceptible to the same weaknesses. This is a process antithetical to an analogous genetic diversity that safeguards
populations by ensuring not all weaknesses are shared by
individual specimens. Obviously, for now, the market
has decided to trade off the protection afforded by diversity, in exchange for focused development efforts and
network effects. The more risk averse can take refuge in
Apple computers, safer largely because the installed base
is small enough that vandals ignore it.
The fact is that the enormous number of home and
small business personal computers — the very market
software makers and service providers are trying to reach
— will always be an Achilles heel to the Internet. The
provisions of service agreements and licences aside, it
must make sense to encourage a solution to be effected
by bigger players, because only that will work (if anything will). Perhaps operating system manufacturers
should be required to bundle anti-virus software, with an
automatic update system that could not be overridden.
Otherwise, small users (though not only they) are a
great systemic problem — many points of weakness
linked to an essential public infrastructure. We can think
of it as not unlike a water utility, the difference being
that every user, a huge population reflecting all the
vagaries of human infirmity and weaknesses of character,
has an equal power not only to take water out, but to put
it in. Historically, this sort of commons has been far
better protected by common law than public oversight.
The analysis in this short paper points to no clear policy
for major legislative intervention, save for the limited
suggestions set out above. Nor does an optimal rule for
apportioning liability in cases of alleged negligence jump
out. The gathering and weighing of evidence in the
emerging cases will guide us on the path the law should
follow. The end point of that path, however, is not in
doubt. Worms are a major scourge in an essential public
infrastructure, and law must contribute what it can to
seeing that they sleep with the fishes.
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